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on page 23: “The Danielic apocalypses of chs. 8-12 and the final form of ch.
7 respond from the midst of one of the most traumatic events in Jewish
history, the violent persecutions of Jews by Antiochus IV and the beginning
of the revolt against Antiochus by Judah the Maccabee” (23).
Finally in regard to the challenging texts from Daniel 11, the conclusion
reached in this commentary is that they “purport to be prophecies but are
clearly written after the occurrence of most of the events they prophesy. But
they use an account of history to attempt to make real predictions” (336).
When reading this statement one cannot help but wonder if this approach to
Daniel can still be of any use to the reader of today. While this commentary
offers some useful material for the study of Daniel (as mentioned above), it
also serves as an example of how not to approach Daniel—with speculative
views that are not in line with the claims found in the sacred texts.
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Alvin Plantinga has taught philosophy for over fifty years, first at Wayne
State University, then at Calvin College, and finally at Notre Dame. He holds
honorary degrees from different universities in Europe and the United States,
and he is widely regarded as the most influential Christian Philosopher alive.
His works include Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism;
Warranted Christian Belief; The Analytic Theist; and God, Freedom, and Evil.
Knowledge and Christian Belief is intended as a shorter and more userfriendly version of Warranted Christian Belief but it is also distinguished from
it by different emphases. The main thesis of the book revolves around the
development and defense of a model, called the Aquinas/Calvin Model
(or A/C Model). According to this model, the divinely inspired Scripture
and the internal instigation of the Spirit produce faith in human beings
(63). This includes belief in the great truths of Christianity. Faith then is
here not contrasted with knowledge, but it is identified as a special kind of
knowledge. Platinga defines knowledge as a belief produced by properly
working cognitive faculties in the right environment that are designed to
successfully aim at truth (26–28). The agency of the Spirit is thus likened to
other knowledge-producing faculties, such as memory or sensory perception.
The only difference is that the faith-producing faculties are provided by the
Holy Spirit and are not naturally found in humans (63).
Knowledge and Christian Belief starts out by describing a number of positions
set forth by different influential philosophers that have the potential to defeat
Christian faith. In Chapter 1 “Can We Speak and Think About God?,”
Plantinga deals with Immanuel Kant and his followers, who claimed that
we cannot say anything about God because we are incapable of thinking in
the categories of ultimate reality. If God exists, he is among those “things
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in themselves” that we can neither experience nor comprehend. Plantinga
identifies this line of thought as self-defeating, because if it were true, we
could not think about God in order to come to the conclusion that we are not
able to think about him. Furthermore, he points out that Kant’s theory fails
to account for a priori knowledge, for example in the realm of mathematics.
Chapter 2 “What is the Question?” confronts the allegation that Christian
belief is in some way irrational, and childish, and somehow connected to
cognitive malfunction. The crucial point here is a distinction between de
facto and de jure objections. De facto objections against the Christian faith are
such that aim at proving the factual beliefs of Christianity to be wrong or
incoherent. De jure objections, on the other hand, would claim that it is not
justified to hold Christian beliefs because it is in some way either unethical
or irrational. Plantinga keeps to de jure objections in this chapter (his main
antagonists are Freud and Marx) and addresses them in different ways. The
main point here is that belief is not something that is subject to our voluntary
control and is therefore ethically neutral. An objection to this based on an
alleged responsibility to believe only that for which we have abundant evidence
remains unconvincing. Plantinga recognizes however that this does not give
Christian belief any warrant and therefore defines the terms “knowledge”
and “warrant” in preparation for further chapters.
In chapters 3–6, Plantinga develops his A/C Model, leaning on texts
from Scripture, Calvin and, Aquinas. His main point here is that Christian
faith is basic belief. It is not derived from argument, but is delivered to man
via his sensus divinitatis. This is not to say that the sensus divinitatis does not use
natural phenomena to awaken faith in God, but the vastness of the sky or
the beauty of nature, which often are quoted in experiences of faith, are not
very strong as arguments. Thus, an inbuilt cognitive faculty that may be called
sensus divinitatis best explains the fact that many people begin to believe while
witnessing these phenomena. Such a faculty is only to be expected, however,
if the Christian faith is also factually true. In short, if it is true, it likely has
warrant. If it is not true, it does not. Mere epistemological considerations, as
Platinga correctly recognizes, will not solve this issue. The de jure question is
therefore dependent on the de facto question. The extended A/C model that
is developed in chapters 5 and 6 claims that the belief infused into humans
by means of the sensus divinitatis is not just about the existence of God, but
also about basic Christian teachings about God’s character, the nature of sin,
and personal salvation. Also of special interest is chapter 6, “Sealed upon Our
Hearts,” in which Platinga challenges the Greek idea of the impassibility of
God.
Chapters 7–10 address different objections and defeaters to the A/C
model. The main objection comes from J. L. Mackie, who claimed that
Christian belief can get and needs to get warrant from experience, and that
this experience must be of such a nature that it implies the truth of Christian
belief. Based on the A/C model, Platinga rejects this claim, because the sensus
divinitatis, like normal sensory perception, is a direct way to gain knowledge
and does not need any form of external evidence. He admits however that
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there may be experiences that exclude the possibility of Christian belief being
true. Some such phenomena, called defeaters, are addressed in the last few
chapters.
Knowledge and Christian Belief presents its reader with a fulminant and very
convincing philosophical defense of Christian belief in the face of its modern
and postmodern opponents. This book is not only thought provoking and
informative, but also relaxing to a certain degree. Platinga confidently and
calmly puts citations by Richard Dawkins next to Scripture and shows the
philosophical shallowness of the young angry atheists and some of their
predecessors. Platinga does not need to raise his voice and he does not take
refuge in spurious arguments taken from fields in which he has no expertise.
There is one issue however, that makes his main thesis, the Aquinas/
Calvin model, somewhat difficult for the non-Calvinist portion of Christianity.
Platinga claims that belief is not subject to our voluntary decision and can
therefore not be subject to moral categories (16–17). Thus, we believe what
we believe and there is nothing we can do about it. This fits perfectly of
course with his emphasis on the sensus divinitatis and the working of the Holy
Spirit that cause faith in us. In good Calvinist tradition, this causation of faith
is sufficient to make us believe and is not dependent on any decision of ours.
If this is the case, there is no real reason to search for external arguments to
convince others of my beliefs. Platinga does not spell it out, but by implication
(and by association with the Calvinist tradition) the reader is led to assume
that the sensus divinitatis is not a universal phenomenon but is found only in
that portion of the populace that accepts the basic teachings of Christianity.
Nevertheless, even though man is not capable of rejecting or choosing God,
but is chosen passively, blame is put on those who do not believe.
The idea that beliefs are formed involuntarily is central to the A/C
model, and thus, the model will not easily pass in Arminian circles. However,
the concept of a sensus divinitatis as a cognitive function that produces faith
in God is not foreign to Arminians, even though we would insist that it is
possible to shake it off. In addition, the subsequent argument that our beliefs
may have warrant after all remains in place and may prove useful. Other
arguments are not mentioned in this review, but are nevertheless deserving of
careful consideration.
Therefore, Knowledge and Christian Belief is a good read, especially for those
who identify as Calvinist, but also for everyone else. It is creative, thought
provoking, and not too difficult to read.
Berrien Springs, Michigan			
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Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics
of Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic,
2013. 328 pp. Hardcover, $34.99.
The need for a comprehensive, up-to-date volume in English covering warfare
in the context of ancient Israel has been felt for some time. Yet recently
published works on this topic have generally confined their treatment to

